Schakowsky Calls on GM to Explain Safety Decisions Surrounding Takata Airbags
MEDIA CONTACT
Cathy Hurwit: 202-225-2111
Schakowsky Calls on GM to Explain Safety Decisions Surrounding Takata Airbags
WASHINGTON, DC – Today, Representative Jan Schakowsky, Ranking Member on the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade (IL-09) wrote Mary T. Barra, Chairman and CEO of the General Motors Company (GM) to request answers about decisions that led to the installation of dangerous Takata airbags in GM vehicles and what steps GM has taken to correct safety issues.
A recent New York Times report revealed that GM installed Takata airbags despite warnings from another supplier and researchers that those airbags were unsafe. GM has also tried to avoid responsibility for previous safety decisions following its 2009 reorganization. In her letter, Representative Schakowsky calls on GM to explain how GM is identifying safety issues, what actions it is taking to ensure that previous safety decisions are thoroughly reviewed, and why it has sought a one-year delay on recalling vehicles with defective Takata airbags.
“Consumers deserve to know the vehicles they drive are safe,” said Representative Schakowsky. “Based on reports, it appears GM prioritized cost over safety. I’m seeking assurance from GM that its safety culture is truly changing and that the mistakes of the past will be corrected to ensure that consumers are safe.”
Full text of the letter:
Dear Ms. Barra:
I write to express my concern whether General Motors Company (“new GM”) is adequately addressing the poor safety decisions it inherited from General Motors Corporation (“old GM”). You twice testified before the House Energy and Commerce Committee in 2014 that new GM is committed to safety in the wake of the deadly ignition switch defaults in GM vehicles that resulted from old GM’s failure to prioritize safety. Recent news reports suggest that old GM also prioritized cost over safety by choosing Takata airbags despite indications that the airbags were unsafe. This information intensifies the need for new GM to truly change the company’s safety culture. I am therefore writing to request information regarding old GM’s decision to install Takata airbags initially as well as the new GM’s subsequent steps to correct those mistakes.
In 2014, the Committee conducted an investigation and held two hearings on GM’s recall of 2.6 million vehicles with faulty ignition switches.[1] The results of GM’s internal investigation at the time revealed that the inadequate safety culture and lack of internal accountability at GM had contributed to its failure to address known safety issues between 2002 and 2013.[2]
The Committee’s investigation revealed the troubling potential for GM to escape liability for those safety failures. In July 2009, the General Motors Corporation (old GM) declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy and underwent reorganization.[3] As part of the restructuring, the corporation’s assets were sold to a new entity known as the General Motors Company (new GM).[4] Attorneys for GM have argued that bankruptcy laws protect new GM from being liable for decisions made by old GM.[5]
In committee hearings in 2014, I and other Democratic Members repeatedly questioned how GM could assure its customers that new GM employed a different safety standard than the clearly deficient standard employed by old GM.[6] In testimony before the Committee, you committed that your company was “leaving no stone unturned, and devoting whatever resources it takes to identify potential safety issues in all of [your] current vehicles and in vehicles no longer in production.”[7] In addition, GM announced the implementation of a number of initiatives to enhance overall safety, including establishing a new Global Product Integrity organization, launching a new program called Speak Up For Safety to encourage employees to report safety risks, and installing a new vice president of Global Safety.[8]
By the end of 2014, GM had issued 77 separate recalls covering nearly 26.6 million vehicles in the United States.[9] This included four recalls related to airbag issues that resulted in the airbag either failing to deploy or only partially deploying in a crash.[10]
Despite this renewed commitment to safety and your assurances that new GM had conducted a thorough review, a New York Times report earlier this year revealed that some GM vehicles contain a safety defect that can be traced back to decisions made before the company was restructured in 2009.[11] The Times found that in the late 1990s, GM pressured their airbag supplier at the time, Autoliv, to match Takata’s cheaper design or risk losing GM’s business. Upon studying Takata’s airbags, Autoliv scientists immediately recognized the risks posed by ammonium nitrate, the compound Takata still uses to detonate the inflators in its airbags. A former Autoliv employee described the results of a test of an ammonium nitrate inflator: “When we lit it off, it totally destroyed the fixture. … It turned it into shrapnel.” Autoliv conveyed to GM that they would not use ammonium nitrate in their inflators. Yet, old GM chose to prioritize cost over safety by switching to Takata airbags that contained ammonium nitrate.[12]
Old GM continued to install Takata airbags even as researchers raised concerns about the safety risks of ammonium nitrate – including in a 2004 review by the United States Council on Automotive Research, a consortium governed in part by GM.[13] Despite these concerns, over 100 million faulty airbags have been installed in vehicles in the United States by GM and other automakers.[14] To date, 16 people have been killed and more than 100 have been injured by Takata airbags in what has become the largest auto safety recall in history.[15]
When asked to explain the company’s push for cheaper airbags, a GM spokesman said the discussions had occurred between “old GM and a supplier” and it was therefore inappropriate to comment.[16] Just a month earlier, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that GM’s 2009 bankruptcy does not shield it from lawsuits arising from the ignition switch defect. The Court found that consumers are not barred from suing new GM given that old GM had not notified consumers of the defect.[17]
New GM’s pattern of evading responsibility undermines its commitments to prioritize safety as well as restore consumer trust. It also raises questions about the thoroughness of the internal investigations undertaken by new GM in 2014 to identify and resolve past safety concerns.
Given the questions raised about new GM’s commitment to resolve safety issues, please respond to the following questions by December 2, 2016:
1. In the aftermath of the ignition switch recall, GM recalled millions of vehicles and implemented a number of initiatives to enhance overall safety. The publicly available information suggests that new GM did not discover the problem with the Takata airbags during this internal review.[18]
a. How did new GM identify the safety issues that led to 77 recalls in 2014?
b. Were the concerns about Takata airbags and their use of ammonium nitrate identified during new GM’s internal review? If not, why not?
2. What actions is new GM taking to now ensure that all safety decisions made by old GM have been thoroughly reviewed? Can GM confidently assure its customers that all GM cars currently on the road – old and new – are safe?
3. In September, new GM petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) for a one-year delay of a planned recall of certain GM vehicles with defective Takata airbags. A GM spokesman asserted that the airbags will “likely perform as designed” for a few more years.[19]
a. Please explain what led to this petition for a one-year delay.
b. NHTSA has warned that “Takata air bags installed in tens of millions of U.S. vehicles are subject to recall due to a safety defect that may cause their inflators to explode and cause serious injuries or deaths.”[20] In light of GM’s own uncertainly regarding the safety of the airbags, how do you reconcile the request for a delay of the recall with your stated commitment to safety?[21]
Thank you in advance for your prompt response to this inquiry.
[1] House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Why Did It Take So Long?, 113th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2014); House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Investigation Update, 113th Cong. (June 18, 2014).
[2] House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Testimony of Anton R. Valukas, Jenner & Block LLP, Hearing on The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Investigation Update, 113th Cong. (June 18, 2014); Jenner & Block LLP, Report to Board of Directors of General Motors Company Regarding Ignition Switch Recalls (May 29, 2014).
[3] Jenner & Block LLP, Report to Board of Directors of General Motors Company Regarding Ignition Switch Recalls (May 29, 2014).
[4]Id.
[5]GM Continues to Seek Shield from Ignition-Switch Suits, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 11, 2016) (www.wsj.com/articles/gm-continues-to-seek-shield-from-ignition-switch-suits-1470951862).
[6] House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Hearing on The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Investigation Update, 113th Cong. (June 18, 2014).
[7] House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Testimony of Mary T. Barra, Chief Executive Officer, General Motors Company, Hearing on The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Investigation Update, 113th Cong. (June 18, 2014).
[8]CEO Mary Barra: “It's Past Time” To Fix GM's Problems, Forbes (June 17, 2014) (www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2014/06/17/ceo-mary-barra-its-past-time-to-fix-gms-problems/#2cbe1a796ff6).
[9]Roundup: All The GM Recalls Of 2014, Car Connection (Nov. 6, 2014) (www.thecarconnection.com/news/1092550_roundup-all-the-gm-recalls-of-2014).
[10]Every General Motors recall in 2014, CNN (Oct. 8, 2014) (www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/05/us/gm-recalls/).
[11]A Cheaper Airbag, and Takata’s Road to a Deadly Crisis, New York Times (Aug. 26, 2016) (www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/business/takata-airbag-recall-crisis.html).
[12]Id.
[13]Id.; United States Council for Automotive Research, Who We Are (www.uscar.org/guest/about) (accessed Oct. 4, 2016).
[14]See note 11.
[15]See note 11; Honda Said to Irk Takata Stakeholders by Going Slow on Deal, Bloomberg (Oct. 3, 2016) (www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-04/hondas-foot-dragging-over-takata-said-to-frustrate-stakeholders).
[16]See note 11.
[17]GM Not Protected from Ignition Switch Claims: U.S. Appeals Court, Reuters (July 13, 2016) (www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-ruling-idUSKCN0ZT1RR); Elliott v. GM LLC(In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2016).
[18]See note 11.
[19]GM Seeks Delay in Recall of 1 Million Vehicles with Takata Airbags, Automotive News (Sept. 16, 2016) (www.autonews.com/article/20160916/OEM11/160919876/gm-seeks-delay-in-recall-of-1-million-vehicles-with-takata-airbags).
[20] National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Recalls Spotlight: Takata Air Bags Recalls (icsw.nhtsa.gov/safercar/rs/takata/) (accessed Oct. 28, 2016).
[21] Indeed, the first sentence on GM’s website for the Takata airbag recalls states: “At General Motors, we’re committed to your safety.” General Motors, The Takata Airbag Safety Recall and How It Affects Your General Motors Vehicle (www.gmtakataairbag.com/product/public/us/en/takata_recall/home.html) (accessed Oct. 28, 2016).